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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3) & (4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury that if it found that

Vaughn's medical bills did not exceed the $3,000 threshold then Mr. Vaughn could not
maintain a cause of action against Anderson for general damages.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly excluded evidence that State Farm, as Mr.

Vaughn's no-fault carrier, had provided PIP benefits in excess of $3,000.
3.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-307(2)(e)(i), which provides a

procedure by which a medical panel may be called to resolve disputes over the reasonable
iii

value of medical expenses in first-party disputes between an insured and his own no-fault
carrier, shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Anderson, in a third-party case, to prove before
trial that Mr. Vaughn's medical expenses did not exceed $3,000.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 & Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 are set forth in an
addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This matter arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on September

25, 1997. (R. at 83-84.)
2.

The parties stipulated that Anderson was negligent and that Anderson's

negligence proximately caused the accident. However, the parties disputed the injuries
and damages that were proximately caused by the accident. Id.
3.

Vaughn claimed that he sustained neck and back injuries as a result of the

accident, as well as an inguinal hernia. (R. at 2.)
4.

Anderson disputed that the accident caused Vaughn's hernia, and therefore

argued at trial that he was not responsible for medical expenses related to the hernia.
5.

Because Vaughn's medical expenses (other than those related to the hernia)

were less than $3000.00, and he did not sustain a permanent impairment, Anderson
argued to the jury that Vaughn had not met the Utah No-Fault Requirements and
therefore, was not entitled to general damages.

1

6.

In an attempt to establish that he had met threshold, Vaughn sought to

introduce evidence that his PIP insurer, State Farm, (also the liability insurer for
Anderson) paid PIP benefits in excess of $3,000. The trial court however, precluded
Vaughn from bringing such evidence before the jury. (R. at 219.)
7.

At the close of evidence, a special verdict form was submitted to the jury

asking them to determine whether they believed, upon a preponderance of the evidence,
that Anderson had proximately caused Vaughn $3,000 or more in medical expenses, or if
he sustained a permanent impairment as a result of Anderson's conduct. (See R. at 16769.)
8.

The jury found, upon a preponderance of the evidence, that Anderson had

not proximately caused Vaughn $3,000 or more in medical expenses and had not caused a
permanent impairment. Id.
9.

Having concluded that Vaughn had not incurred $3,000 or more in medical

expenses as a proximate result of Anderson's negligence, and had not sustained a
permanent impairment, the jury was instructed not to further consider Vaughn's claim for
general damages and a judgment was entered in favor of Anderson. (R. at 201-03.)
10.

Vaughn filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict raising

substantially the same issues as raised on this appeal. (R. at 210-30.)
11.

Vaughn's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. (R.

at 254-55.)

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court's decision to deny Vaughn's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict should be affirmed. No error was committed where the trial court's special
verdict form correctly and sufficiently advised the jury as to the status of the law.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence that
Vaughn's PIP carrier paid benefits in excess of $3000.00. Vaughn's PIP carrier had a
duty to pay the PIP benefits that arose out of a first-party contractual relationship with
Vaughn. Evidence of PIP payments of an insurance company is not admissible to
establish that the threshold of $3,000 under UCA § 31A-22-309 has been met. C.T. ex
rel Taylor v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1999). As such, evidence of such
payment was properly excluded.
Finally, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Vaughn, the plaintiff, had
the burden to demonstrate that his medical expenses exceeded the $3,000 threshold. The
no-fault statutory scheme does not shift the burden of proof to defendants. Interpreting the
statute in the way suggested by Vaughn would undermine the multi-faceted purposes of
the no-fault statutory scheme. As such, the trial court correctly interpreted the No-Fault
statute and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
1.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUBMITTED A SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM TO THE JURY THAT REQUIRED THE JURY TO DETERMINE
WHETHER VAUGHN'S MEDICAL EXPENSES MET OR EXCEEDED
THE $3,000 THRESHOLD BEFORE CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF
GENERAL DAMAGES
This Court should affirm Judge Hilder's submission of the special verdict form to

the jury as no error was committed. Special verdict forms are reviewed for correctness as
the "special verdict form is a jury instruction, and determining the propriety of jury
instructions presents a question of law." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125,
136 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, ^22, 984 P.2d 960
(Utah 1999). Furthermore, this Court should only find error with the trial court's special
verdict form "if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." Tingey v. Christensen, 1999
UT 68,116, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999).
The special verdict form submitted to the jury in this case did not mislead the jury
nor prejudice Mr. Vaughn as it sufficiently and correctly advised the jury on the law.
A.

The Special Verdict Form Sufficiently and Correctly Advised the Jury
Regarding Utah Law

Utah's No-Fault statute explicitly provides that a plaintiff "may not maintain a
cause of action for general damages" unless the injured person has sustained "(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment; (iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon
objective findings; (iv) permanent disfigurement; or (v) medical expenses to a person in
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excess of $3,000." Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(l)(a) (hereinafter "§309(l)(a)"); see
also Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The purpose of this
"partial tort immunity" is to "preclude vexatious lawsuits against tortfeasors to recover
relatively minor damages." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, | | 1 5 , 17, 56
P.3d 524 (Utah 2002). In addition to precluding vexatious lawsuits, "[a] primary
objective of the statute is to create a more efficient and equitable method for handling the
bulk of personal injury claims in a cost effective manner." Warren, 937 P.2d at 562.
Vaughn has argued that the issue of whether or not his medical expenses exceeded
the $3000.00 threshold cannot be raised at trial. This position has no merit. Section
309(1 )(a) only limits causes of action for general damages. As such, it is appropriate to
raise the threshold issue at trial where the amount of medical expenses (i.e. special
damages) is reasonably disputable. See e.g., C.T. by and through Taylor v. Johnson, 1999
UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999); Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68,1J5, 987 P.2d 588
(Utah 1999) (plaintiff was not entitled to general damages after jury returned verdict that
damages had not exceeded $3,000 threshold). In addition to raising the issue at trial,
threshold can also be raised at any other appropriate time by motion. See e.g., McNair v.
Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (defendant was entitled to summary
judgment where plaintiffs medical expenses did not exceed $3,000).
The facts of this case are similar to those in Taylor where the plaintiff sought
damages following an automobile accident with the defendant. Taylor, 1999 UT 35 ^2,
977 P.2d 479. The Taylor plaintiff alleged that he had sustained $4,596.00 in medical
5

expenses and therefore met the statutory requirement of having incurred in excess of
$3,000 in medical expenses. Id. p n.2. However, the jury found that "only $339.00 of
the plaintiffs medical expenses were proximately caused by the accident with Johnson."
Id. ^[3, 7. Based on the jury's determination under §309(1 )(a) that the plaintiff had not
reasonably and necessarily incurred in excess of the $3,000 threshold amount, the trial
court found in favor of the defendant. Id. f 7.
Like the trial judge in Taylor, Judge Hilder's special verdict form was not
misleading to the jury because it sufficiently and correctly advised the jury that Vaughn
may not maintain a cause of action against Anderson for general damages unless he met
or exceeded the $3,000 threshold requirement. Paragraph three of the special verdict
form instructed the jury to answer "yes" or "no" to the following question:
From a preponderance of the evidence, has the Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn
sustained $3,000 or more in medical expenses as a proximate result of the
accident?
(R. at 167.) If the jury responded "no" to that question, they were instructed not to
answer question number four, which asked them to ascertain the total amount of damages,
including general damages. Id. at 167-68. This was a sufficient and correct instruction as
it accurately reflected the law as set forth in §309(l)(a). The jury followed the special
verdict form and responded that Mr. Vaughn had not sustained $3,000 or more in medical
expenses. Id. Therefore, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT PAID IN PIP COVERAGE
BY VAUGHN'S NO-FAULT CARRIER
The trial court, under Rule 403, excluded evidence that State Farm Insurance

(Vaughn's PIP carrier) paid over $3,000 in PIP benefits to Vaughn. Vaughn sought to
introduce such evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that he met threshold. Judge
Hilder did not abuse his discretion in excluding such evidence as the Utah Supreme Court
has held that evidence of PIP payments of an insurance company is not admissible to
establish that the threshold of $3,000 under UCA § 31A-22-309 has been met. CT. ex
rel Taylor v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1999). The standard of review for
whether a trial court properly excluded evidence under Rule 403 is abuse of discretion.
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, |35 n.l, 104 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004).
Vaughn has argued that the exclusion of this evidence allowed Anderson "to
hypocritically make threshold the major issue in the case," after "the court precluded [Mr.
Vaughn] from adducing evidence of the evaluative process performed by the defendant's
liability carrier." (Appellant's Brief at 15.) However, Vaughn's position that Anderson's
liability carrier (the same carrier that paid PIP benefits) evaluated Vaughn's damages in
excess of $3,000 mischaracterizes the relationship State Farm had with Vaughn. State
Farm was the liabilty insurer for Anderson and the no-fault insurer for Vaughn. The
"evaluative process" Vaughn refers to was State Farm's determination to pay $3,530.61
in PIP benefits on behalf of Vaughn. (R. at 226-27.) Vaughn's argument that State Farm
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made such an evaluation as Anderson's liability carrier is misleading because State Farm
actually made that evaluation as Vaughn's no-fault carrier.
In this case, as his PIP carrier, State Farm owed Vaughn a duty created by the
first-party contractual relationship. See Taylor, 1999 UT 35, fl n.3, 977 P.2d 479. It was
under this duty that the PIP benefits were paid. A very different relationship existed,
however, between State Farm and Vaughn in the liability claim against Anderson. In that
situation, State Farm and Vaughn have a third party relationship very different from the
PIP setting. In the third party litigation setting, State Farm has a duty to its insured, Mr.
Anderson, to evaluate Vaughn's claims, and pay only what is related to the accident.
This very issue was addressed in Taylor when the Utah Supreme Court specifically
rejected the plaintiffs argument that PIP payments made by an insurer could establish the
threshold amount for his medical expenses. Id. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
specifically determined that a PIP payment made by a plaintiffs own insurer did not
establish the threshold amount for his medical expenses, because the mere fact that the
PIP insurer paid for medical expenses which the jury found were not related to the
accident was not binding on the defendant for purposes of establishing the threshold and
exposing him to liability for general damages, particularly since a PIP carrier has a first
party contractual relationship with its insured and owes that insured certain duties. Id.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Taylor,
We reject [Plaintiffs] argument that the Personal Injury Payment ("PIP")
made by his own insurer establishes the threshold amount for his medical
expenses. The mere fact that his PIP insurer paid for medical expenses
8

which the jury found were not related to the accident should not be binding
on [Defendant] for purposes of establishing the medical expenses threshold
and exposing [Defendant] to liability for general damages. This is
especially so since a PIP carrier has a first party contractual relationship
with its insured-in this case [Plaintiff]--and owes certain duties to him.
See Taylor, 1999 UT 35,17 n.3, 977 P.2d 479. According to the clear holding of the
Utah Supreme Court in the Taylor case, the trial court in this matter did not abuse its
discretion when it precluded evidence of the payment of PIP benefits for the purpose of
establishing threshold. As such, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
III.

SECTION 31A-22-307(2)(e) DOES NOT IMPOSE A BURDEN ON THE
DEFENDANT TO PROVE, PRIOR TO TRIAL, THAT PLAINTIFF'S
MEDICAL EXPENSES DID NOT EXCEED $3,000
The Court should affirm the trial court's decision to deny Vaughn's motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Judge Hilder correctly interpreted the nofault statutory scheme which requires Vaughn to prove, at trial, that his medical expenses
related to the accident exceeded $3,000. "The interpretation of statutory provisions
presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, granting no deference to the
trial court." Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, f7, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 2005).
Vaughn has asked this Court to read the No-Fault statute as placing a burden on
defendants, prior to trial, to prove that the plaintiffs medical expenses did not exceed the
$3,000 threshold. Vaughn contends that allowing a plaintiff to proceed to trial and then
requiring him to bear the burden of proof that his medical expenses exceed the threshold
conflicts with the purpose of "screening] less-severe cases from the court system"
because it allows a plaintiff to go through a "full-fledged civil trial" only to have his
9

claims for general damages rejected after the jury has heard all the evidence. (App. Brief
at 9.) Contrary to Vaughn's argument, §309(l)(a) does not preclude the jury from
hearing evidence on special damages, including medical expenses; it merely precludes a
plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action for general damages unless it is proven that
his medical expenses exceeded $3,000.
Vaughn has proposed that the Court read §31A-22-309(l)(a) (hereinafter
"§309(l)(a)") in conjunction with §31A-22-307(2)(e) (hereinafter "§307(2)(e)") and
interpret those sections as precluding a jury instruction on the threshold issue. However,
this interpretation of the statute conflates two provisions that serve different purposes and
would shift the burden of proof to defendants to prove that a plaintiffs medical expenses
have not exceeded threshold before trial begins.
First, §307(2)(e) and §309(l)(a) serve two distinct purposes within the overall nofault scheme. The purpose of §307(2)(e) is to ensure that an injured party receives
immediate and fair compensation for his medical expenses when a dispute arises between
an insured and his no-fault insurer. By comparison, the purpose of §309(l)(a) is to
prevent vexatious lawsuits to recover relatively minor damages by requiring plaintiffs to
incur more than $3,000 in reasonable medical expenses before maintaining a cause of
action. Finally, the no-fault statutory scheme does not place the burden on the defendant
to disprove plaintiffs claims.

10

A.

Sections 31a-22-307 and 31a-22-309 Serve Different Purposes under the
No-fault Statutory Scheme

The no-fault statutory scheme has more than one purpose and it employs
§307(2)(e) differently than §309(l)(a) in order to effectuate those different purposes. As
noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Prince, "Utah's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
has two primary components: "(1) no-fault PIP insurance coverage, and (2) partial tort
immunity from certain PIP-typed claims for tortfeasors." 2002 UT 68, ^15, 56 P.3d 524;
see also Bear River Mut, Ins. Co, v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999)
(distinguishing between the two purposes of the no-fault statutes); Allstate Ins, Co, v. Ivie,
606 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah, 1980) ("The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, partial tort
exemption law coupling no-fault insurance benefits [] with a partial elimination of tort
claims for bodily injury."). Even the cases cited by Vaughn do not support the
conclusion that §307(2)(e) and §309(1 )(a) were intended to serve the single purpose of
preventing smaller cases from clogging up the courts. See George v. Welch, 997 P.2d
1248, 1251 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the purpose of the threshold requirement is
distinguishable from the overall purpose of the no-fault act); Montgomery v. Daniels, 340
N.E.2d 444, 446 (N.Y. 1975) ("One prong [of the no-fault statute] deals with
compensation; the other with limitation of tort actions."); Creswell v. Medical W.
Community Health Plan, 644 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Mass. 1995) (The three purposes of the
no-fault statute are "to reduce the number of small motor vehicle tort cases being entered
in the courts of the Commonwealth, to provide a prompt, inexpensive means of
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reimbursing claimants for out-of-pocket expenses, and to address the high cost of motor
vehicle insurance in the Commonwealth."); Dairy land Ins. Co. v. Starkey, 535 N.W.2d
363, 365 (Minn. 1995) ("no-fault automobile insurance laws are intended to relieve the
economic distress of uncompensated victims;" "to prevent overcompensation and provide
offsets to avoid duplicate recovery;" "[to] speed the administration of justice and ease the
burden of litigation on the courts;" "and place the claimants in the same position they
would have been in had the tortfeasor had liability insurance").
1.

The purpose of § 31A-22-307(2)(e) is to provide a procedure for
determining the reasonable value of medical expenses when a
dispute arises between an insured an his PIP insurer

Section 31A-22-307(2)(e) addresses the PIP coverage component of the no-fault
statutory scheme by providing a procedure to determine the reasonable value of medical
expenses in dispute between an insured and his own no-fault carrier. Utah Code Ann. §
31A-22-307(2)(e); see Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992)
("PIP benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket
expenses and actual loss of earnings incurred as a result of an accident without having to
bring a lawsuit."). This subsection must be read in light of the overall purpose of §31A22-307 which describes "the parameters of an insurer's obligations concerning personal
injury protection coverages and benefits." Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002
UT 54, f 13, 53 P.3d 947 (Utah 2002). Reading §307(2)(e) in the context of §31A-22-307
demonstrates that §307(2)(e) was intended to function as a part of the PIP-coverage
component of the no-fault statutory scheme and is consistent with the general purpose of
12

PIP coverage, namely, "to ensure that insurance companies provide immediate minimal
health benefits for covered individuals injured in automobile accidents." See Prince,
2002 UT 68,1|17, 56 P.3d 524 (citing Regal Ins, Co. V. Bott, 2001 UT 71, f 11, 31 P.3d
524).
2.

The purpose of §31A-22-309(l)(a) is to require plaintiffs to incur
more than $3,000 in reasonable medical expenses before
maintaining a cause of action

On the other hand, §31A-22-309(l)(a) addresses the second component of the nofault scheme, "to preclude vexatious lawsuits against tortfeasors to recover relatively
minor damages." Prince, 2002 UT 68, |17, 56 P.3d 524; see also Jepson v. Department
of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that §31A-22-309
"merely prescribes certain threshold requirements to be satisfied in order to maintain a
personal injury cause of action."). Just as §307(2)(e) does not address limitations on a
plaintiffs right to maintain a cause of action, §309(l)(a) does not address the purpose of
ensuring that injured parties receive compensation from their no-fault cairriers. These two
provisions are both part of the no-fault statutory scheme; however, they serve entirely
different purposes within that scheme.
B.

The No-fault Statutory Scheme Does Not Place the Burden on the
Defendant to Disprove Plaintiffs Claims for Medical Expenses

Furthermore, §307(2)(e) does not place a burden on a defendant in a third-party
case to prove, before trial, that the medical expenses proximately caused by the accident
did not exceed threshold. Reading §307(2)(e) to create a "pre-adjudicative screening
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process" in third-party cases, as argued by Mr. Vaughn, would defeat the purpose of
§309(1 )(a) because it would allow plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action regardless of
whether their medical expenses were "proximately caused" by the defendant's
negligence so long as they could show that the "reasonable value" of the medical services
they received exceeded $3,000.
Section 307(2)(e) reads, "In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the
motion of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three
licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable
value of the claimant's medical expenses" Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307(2)(e)
(emphasis added). Because the panel of physicians is not authorized to testify as to
proximate cause, medical necessity or reasonableness of treatment, a plaintiff could
completely avoid the threshold requirement by simply continuing to receive treatment
long after it was medically necessary in order to accumulate reasonably valued medical
expenses in excess of $3,000. However, §309(l)(a) requires plaintiffs to not only
demonstrate that they had received $3,000 worth of medical services, but also that those
medical services were proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. See Utah Code
Ann. §31 A-22-309(l)(a) (claims must arise "out of personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by an automobile accident"). Any other reading of this statute would undermine
the purpose of precluding vexatious lawsuits and would increase litigation and insurance
costs.

14

In this case Vaughn offered evidence that his medical expenses exceeded the
$3,000 threshold . {See App. Brief at 5.) However, the jury ultimately decided that while
Vaughn may have incurred such expenses, the medical expenses related to the accident
with Anderson did not exceed $3,000. (R. at 202.) This was the correct result and the
jury did not commit clear error because §309(l)(a) does not ask if a person has spent
more than $3,000 in medical bills, but rather whether a person incurred more than $3,000
as a proximate result of the automobile accident.
Furthermore, Vaughn's proposed interpretation would unjustifiably shift the
burden of proof to the defendant by requiring the defendant to disprove the plaintiffs
claimed medical expenses before even going to trial. Contrary to Vaughn's assertion that
the no-fault statute creates "an additional burden of proof for plaintiffs," the burden of
proving a claim for damages has always rested on the plaintiff. {See App. Brief at 9); see
also Bennion v. Le Grand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985)
(plaintiffs had the burden of proving their damages).
Even assuming that §307(2)(e) were to apply in third-party cases, it would not shift
the burden to the defendant to disprove the plaintiffs claim because it is a purely
discretionary provision that uses the discretionary language "may" instead of mandatory
language like "shall" or "must." See Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851
P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). ("It merely allows a court, in its discretion, to
designate a panel of medical experts to testify at a hearing before the court on the issue of
the reasonable cost of services.").
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Because interpreting the no-fault statutes as proposed by Vaughn would ignore the
multi-faceted purposes of the overall statutory scheme, would undermine the express
purpose of §309(l)(a), and would unjustifiably shift the burden of proof to the defendant,
the Court should affirm the trial court's interpretation of the no-fault statutes that allowed
submission of the threshold issue to the jury after evidence of special damages had been
adduced.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court because the trial court
committed no legal error, nor did it abuse its discretion regarding the admission of
evidence. Judge Hilder's special verdict form on the threshold issue correctly and
sufficiently advised the jury on the law. Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion when
he excluded evidence regarding Vaughn's PIP payments. Finally, Judge Hilder correctly
interpreted the no-fault statutory scheme because Vaughn had the burden to prove that his
medical expenses exceeded $3,000 and the no-fault statutory scheme does not shift that
burden to the defendant.
DATED this ^ X day of March, 2005.
STRONG & HANNI

Kristin A. VanOrman
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-307 & 31A-22-309 are attached.
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